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Firms dedicate large portions of financial disclosures to updating and 
discussing their strategy and plans for the future, and investors often evaluate those 
plans after learning how the firm performed in the current period. I examine how 
current-period performance shapes investors’ beliefs about the appropriateness of 
managerial optimism which, in turn, affects their evaluation of firms that focus on 
either challenges or opportunities in future-oriented disclosures. I conduct three 
experiments that test my process theory. I hypothesize and find that a firm’s current-
period performance shapes investors’ beliefs about whether managers can best achieve 
success by being more or less optimistic about the future. When a firm is performing 
poorly, investors believe that managers can best achieve success by being more 
optimistic and less realistic about the future, and therefore invest more if the firm 
focuses on opportunities rather than challenges in future-oriented disclosures. When a 
firm is performing well, on the other hand, investors believe that managers can best 
achieve success by being more realistic and less optimistic about the future, and 
therefore invest more if the firm focuses on challenges rather than opportunities. These 
results challenge the notion that investors always react positively (negatively) to 
disclosures that focus on opportunities (challenges). Instead, these results suggest 
circumstances in which managers can benefit by focusing on challenges, in order to 
signal a more realistic and less optimistic outlook about the future. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODCUTION 
 
Firms dedicate large portions of financial disclosures to updating and 
discussing their strategy and plans for the future. Within these disclosures, firms take 
different approaches to discussing their strategies and plans.  Sometimes they focus on 
potential negative outcomes (challenges) and discuss how their strategies allow them 
to avoid those negative outcomes. Other times they focus on potential positive 
outcomes (opportunities) and discuss how their strategies allow them to obtain those 
positive outcomes. Investors and analysts often consider these disclosures after 
learning how the firm performed in the current period, both because firms’ earnings 
announcements begin the disclosure cycle and because discussions of current-period 
performance almost always precede discussions of the firm’s strategy and plans for the 
future within earnings releases, conference calls, letters to shareholders, and 10-Ks. 
Given that investors process information about past performance and future plans in 
this way, I test whether current-period performance shapes how investors evaluate 
firms that focus on either challenges or opportunities in future-oriented disclosures.   
These tests are important because they provide evidence of a pervasive 
moderating factor that affects how investors evaluate future-oriented disclosures. Prior 
archival research provides evidence that investors react positively to disclosures that 
have a positive focus (i.e., positive disclosure “tone”) and negatively to disclosures 
that have a negative focus (i.e., negative disclosure “tone”) (e.g., see Lang and 
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Lundholm 2000; Henry 2008; Li 2010; Davis et al. 2012; Price et al. 2012; Huang et 
al. 2014; Davis et al. 2015). While this prior research identifies a main effect of tone 
on investors’ reactions, I test whether tone interacts with current-period performance 
to determine investors’ reactions.  In addition, prior literature relies on measures of 
positive and negative tone that are very broad, capturing information about the content 
of a firm’s past performance and future plans as well as the manner in which firms 
present that information (Henry 2008; Davis et al. 2014; Tan et al. 2014). I disentangle 
these effects by holding constant the content of a firm’s future plans and manipulating 
the presentation of those plans (manipulating whether they focus on challenges or 
opportunities). This approach allows me to test how investors react to a component of 
tone that is more discretionary in nature.   
I draw from psychology research on optimism and self-presentation to derive 
my predictions.  Prior psychology research suggests that a firm’s current-period 
performance will activate different lay theories about whether managers can best 
achieve success by being more or less optimistic about the future (Armor et al. 2008; 
Tenney et al. 2015). Specifically, this literature suggests that poor recent performance 
will trigger lay theories about the benefits of optimism— that it fosters a hopeful 
outlook, positive emotions, and task persistence that can help managers make the 
necessary changes to improve performance (Frederickson 2001; Tenney et al. 2015). 
Conversely, this literature suggests that successful recent performance will trigger lay 
theories about the costs of optimism—that it causes overconfidence, which blinds 
managers to important environmental challenges and contingencies that they would 
otherwise recognize (Schlenker and Leary 1982; Wosinska et al. 1996; Hareli and 
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Weiner 2000; Pronin et al. 2002). Accordingly, I predict that when a firm is 
performing poorly, investors will believe that managers can best achieve success by 
being more optimistic about the future; whereas, when a firm is performing well, 
investors will believe that managers can best achieve success by being more realistic 
about the future  
Second, I draw from literature that suggests investors will perceive 
opportunity-focused disclosures as conveying optimistic managerial beliefs and 
challenge-focused disclosures as conveying realistic managerial beliefs (Buehler et al. 
2002). Accordingly, I predict that investors who believe that managers can best 
achieve success by being more realistic about the future will invest more when the 
firm focuses on challenges rather than opportunities, and investors who believe that 
managers can best achieve success by being more optimistic about the future will 
invest more when the firm focuses on opportunities rather than challenges.  
Together, these streams of literature suggest that when a firm is performing 
well, investors will believe that managers can best achieve success by being more 
realistic about the future, and will therefore invest more when the firm focuses on 
challenges rather than opportunities in future-oriented disclosures. Conversely, when a 
firm is performing poorly, investors will believe that managers can best achieve 
success by being more optimistic about the future, and will therefore invest more 
when the firm focuses on opportunities rather than challenges. 
I conduct three experiments to test these predictions and the theoretical process 
underlying them. Experiment 1 tests the overall effect that I predict by examining 
whether current-period performance shapes how investors evaluate firms that focus on 
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either challenges or opportunities in future-oriented disclosures. Experiments 2 and 3 
test whether this effect operates through participants’ beliefs about the benefits of 
managerial optimism.  
In all three experiments, participants assume the role of investor and evaluate 
ProCom Inc., a fictional firm in the business services industry. Experiment 1 
manipulates ProCom’s current-period performance (good news or bad news) and the 
presentation of ProCom’s letter to shareholders (challenge-focused or opportunity-
focused). Participants read about ProCom’s recent performance in an earnings release, 
read about ProCom’s plans for the future in a letter to shareholders, and then decide 
whether to increase, decrease, or maintain their investment in ProCom. Results 
indicate that when a firm is performing poorly, investors invest more if that firm 
focuses on opportunities rather than challenges in future-oriented disclosures. In 
contrast, when a firm is performing well, investors invest more if that firm focuses on 
challenges rather than opportunities in future-oriented disclosures. Additional analyses 
provide evidence that investors are aware that current-period performance influences 
how they evaluate firms that focus on either challenges or opportunities in future-
oriented disclosures but are unaware of the full extent of that influence.  
I then test the causal chain producing the effect demonstrated in Experiment 1 
in two steps (Spencer et al. 2005). Experiment 2 tests the first link in the causal chain 
by manipulating ProCom’s current-period performance (good news or bad news) and 
measuring participants’ beliefs about the benefits of managerial optimism. An 
independent group of participants read about ProCom’s recent performance and then 
indicate whether they believe ProCom’s managers can best achieve success by being 
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more or less optimistic about the future. Results indicate that a firm’s current-period 
performance shapes investors’ beliefs about the benefits of managerial optimism. 
Specifically, when a firm is performing poorly, investors believe that managers can 
best achieve success by being more optimistic and less realistic about the future; when 
a firm is performing well, investors believe that managers can best achieve success by 
being more realistic and less optimistic about the future. 
Experiment 3 tests the second link in the causal chain by directly manipulating 
investors’ beliefs about the benefits of managerial optimism and the presentation of 
ProCom’s letter to shareholders (challenge-focused or opportunity-focused), and 
measuring participants’ investment decisions. Participants read either an article 
describing the benefits of managerial optimism or an article describing the benefits of 
managerial realism. They then read ProCom’s letter to shareholders and decide 
whether to increase, decrease, or maintain their investment in ProCom. Results 
indicate that investors’ beliefs about the benefits of managerial optimism shape how 
investors evaluate firms that focus on either challenges or opportunities in future-
oriented disclosures. Specifically, investors invest more in a firm that focuses on 
opportunities rather than challenges after reading an article describing the benefits of 
managerial optimism, but not after reading an article describing the benefits of 
managerial realism.  
Together, Experiments 1-3 provide evidence that a firm’s current-period 
performance shapes investors’ beliefs about the benefits of managerial optimism, 
which in turn shape how investors evaluate firms that focus on either challenges or 
opportunities in future-oriented disclosures.  
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This paper contributes to the accounting and psychology literature in five main 
ways. First, it contributes to archival and experimental research on disclosure tone. 
This study challenges a notion in the accounting and finance archival literatures that 
investors always react positively to disclosures with a positive focus (i.e., positive 
disclosure tone) and negatively to disclosures with a negative focus (i.e., negative 
disclosure tone) (Lang and Lundholm 2000; Henry 2008; Li 2010; Davis et al. 2012; 
Price et al. 2012; Davis et al. 2015). While prior research identifies a main effect of 
tone, I provide evidence that tone interacts with a key environmental factor – current-
period performance.  I manipulate constructs that prior archival measures would 
categorize as “positive” or “negative” tone and provide evidence of circumstances in 
which investors predictably react positively to negative tone and negatively to positive 
tone. Also, while archival measures of tone capture both the content and presentation 
of a firm’s past performance and future plans, I disentangle these constructs and focus 
on the presentation of a firm’s future plans. Thus, my results suggest that the broad 
measures of tone used in prior archival research may mask how investors react to the 
manner in which firms present their plans and strategies in future-oriented disclosures.     
This study also complements recent experimental research by Tan et al. (2014) 
on disclosure tone. Tan et al. (2014) examine how investors react to disclosure tone in 
disclosures that focus exclusively on past performance. They find that when 
readability is low, unsophisticated investors react positively to positive disclosure 
tone, and sophisticated investors react negatively to positive disclosure tone. My study 
complements theirs by examining how investors react to tone in disclosures that focus 
exclusively on the future, and by examining how investors’ reactions depend on a 
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firm’s past performance. More broadly, my study complements a burgeoning 
experimental literature on how investors respond to qualitative features of narrative 
financial disclosures (see Libby and Emett 2014 for a review and Elliott et al. 2015 for 
a recent example).  
Second, this research contributes to the accounting literature on managerial 
optimism and overconfidence. Prior literature provides evidence that managerial 
optimism causes managers to make sub-optimal operational and reporting decisions 
(e.g., see Camerer and Lovallo 1999; Malmendier and Tate 2005; Billett and Qian 
2008; Libby and Rennekamp 2012; Hribar and Yang 2015; Schrand and Zechman 
2012; Asay 2015). This paper examines managerial optimism from the perspective of 
an investor. It contributes to the literature by providing evidence that, despite the 
documented costs of managerial optimism, there are circumstances in which investors 
believe that it is beneficial, and make investment decisions based on those beliefs.  
Third, this research provides practical recommendations to managers and 
investors. For managers, it provides recommendations on how to design persuasive 
future-oriented disclosures. Whereas managers might be tempted to focus on positive 
outcomes in future-oriented disclosures, this research suggests that managers can 
sometimes benefit by focusing on negative outcomes following good performance in 
order to signal a more realistic and less optimistic outlook about the future. For 
investors, it provides evidence on systematic ways in which current-period 
performance influences how they evaluate firms with different approaches to future-
oriented disclosures. Although my study suggests that investors are aware of this 
influence, it also suggests that investors are not aware of the full extent of its 
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influence. Thus, investors may wish to take steps to attenuate the impact of a firm’s 
current-period performance on how they evaluate future-oriented disclosures.  
Fourth, this research contributes to the psychology literature by providing 
evidence of a novel construct that moderates individuals’ beliefs about the benefits of 
optimism, and by studying the downstream consequences of those beliefs. Prior 
psychology research provides evidence that individuals believe optimism improves 
performance when someone is implementing a decision but not when they are 
deliberating on a decision (Armor et al. 2008; Tenney et al. 2015). My research 
provides evidence that individuals believe that optimism improves performance when 
someone is struggling but not when someone is succeeding.  
Finally, this research contributes to the accounting literature by introducing an 
alternative method by which researchers can test a hypothesized theoretical process. 
Accounting researchers often test a hypothesized process by conducting a single study 
that manipulates independent variable(s) and measures mediating and dependent 
variables (“mediation-by-measurement”). As I discuss in more detail in section 2, that 
approach has some limitations (Spencer et al. 2005; Griffith et al. 2015; Libby et al. 
2015) and is particularly problematic for studies like mine that capture mediating 
constructs that are difficult to measure unobtrusively and manipulate variables that can 
influence responses for more than one reason. I introduce an alternative approach 
advocated by Spencer et al. (2005), in which I conduct a series of experiments that 
tests each link in the hypothesized causal chain. This “mediation-by-manipulation” 
approach to testing process avoids some of the limitations of “mediation-by-
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measurement” designs and capitalizes on the comparative advantages of experiments 
(Spencer et al. 2005; Libby et al. 2002). 
Section 2 of this paper reviews relevant literature and develops my predictions. 
Sections 3-5 discuss methodology and results for Experiments 1-3, respectively.  
Section 6 discusses the paper’s contributions, limitations, and directions for future 
research.
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
 
As seen in Figure 1, I propose that a firm’s current-period performance shapes 
investors’ beliefs about whether managers can best achieve success by being more or 
less optimistic about the future, which in turn shape how investors evaluate firms that 
focus on either challenges or opportunities in future-oriented disclosures (denoted 
Experiment 1 in Figure 1).  Below, I develop predictions related to each causal link in 
the model. I first develop predictions about how a firm’s current-period performance 
shapes investors’ beliefs about the benefits of managerial optimism (denoted 
Experiment 2 in Figure 1). I then develop predictions about how investors’ beliefs 
about the benefits of managerial optimism influence how investors evaluate firms that 
focus on either challenges or opportunities in future-oriented disclosures (denoted 
Experiment 3 in Figure 1).   
2.1 Does Current-Period Performance Affect Investors’ Beliefs about the Benefits 
of Managerial Optimism? 
 
 A large body of literature in psychology provides evidence that people are 
“unrealistically optimistic”—they overestimate the probability of favorable outcomes 
and underestimate the probability of unfavorable outcomes (e.g., see Weinstein 1980; 
Shepperd et al. 2013). For example, consumers overestimate their ability to pay off 
credit card debt, selecting credit cards with higher interest rates as a result (Yang et al. 
2007). Cardiac patients underestimate their risk of future cardiac events, which lowers 
their stress levels and decreases their risk of future cardiac events (Hevey et al. 2014).   
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Figure 1. Theoretical Model and Overview of Experiments 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 depicts the theoretical model underlying my predictions and outlines my approach in testing 
the theoretical model. The model proposes that a firm’s current-period performance shapes whether 
investors believe that managers can best achieve success by being optimistic or realistic about the 
future, which in turn shapes whether investors respond positively or negatively to future-oriented 
disclosures that focus on challenges or opportunities. I test the entire proposed process in Experiment 1. 
Experiments 2 and 3 test each link in the causal chain. In particular, Experiment 2 tests whether a firm’s 
current-period performance shapes investors’ beliefs about the benefits of managerial optimism. 
Experiment 3 tests whether investors’ beliefs about the benefits of managerial optimism shape whether 
investors respond positively or negatively to future-oriented disclosures that focus on challenges or 
opportunities.  
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In the accounting and finance domain, research provides evidence that 
unrealistic optimism causes managers to make sub-optimal operational and reporting 
decisions. Optimistic managers are more likely to enter unprofitable markets (Camerer 
and Lovallo 1999), more likely to overinvest when they have available capital and 
underinvest when they need external financing (Malmendier and Tate 2005), more 
likely to make unprofitable acquisitions (Billett and Qian 2008), more likely to 
commit to costly disclosure (Libby and Rennekamp 2012; Hribar and Yang 2015), and 
more likely to manage earnings (Schrand and Zechman 2012; Asay 2015).  
Despite the documented costs of managerial optimism, investors may 
sometimes believe that it is beneficial. Psychology research provides evidence that 
people believe that others can best achieve success on a variety of tasks by being more 
optimistic and less realistic about their prospects on those tasks (Armor et al. 2008). 
People tend to believe that optimism fosters a hopeful outlook, positive emotions, and 
task persistence, which help improve task performance (Armor and Taylor 1998; 
Tenney et al. 2015; Tugade and Frederickson 2004). These lay beliefs about optimism 
cause people to consistently overestimate the extent to which optimism actually helps 
people succeed (Tenney et al. 2015).   
However, people do not always believe that optimism is beneficial. For 
example, people are less likely to believe that optimism is beneficial when someone is 
deliberating a decision (rather than implementing a decision) or when someone has 
little control over their performance (Armor et al. 2008; Tenney et al. 2015). Thus, 
task and environmental factors can activate different lay theories about the benefits of 
optimism, which yield different conclusions about the benefits of optimism. Extending 
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this line of research, I test whether a firm’s recent performance shapes investors’ 
beliefs about whether managers can best achieve success by being more or less 
optimistic about the future.  
I first predict that poor recent performance will trigger the lay theories 
discussed above about the benefits of optimism—that it fosters a hopeful outlook, 
positive emotions, and task persistence (Armor and Taylor 1998; Tenney et al. 2015; 
Tugade and Frederickson 2004).  Such lay theories will lead investors to believe that 
more optimism and less realism about the future can help struggling managers make 
the necessary changes to improve performance (Frederickson 2001). Accordingly, I 
predict that when a firm is performing poorly, investors will believe that managers can 
best achieve success by being more optimistic and less realistic about the future. 
On the other hand, I predict that successful recent performance will trigger lay 
theories about the costs of optimism. Prior psychology research provides evidence that 
when evaluating a person who has recently succeeded, people react favorably to those 
who understate their achievements and future prospects and react unfavorably to those 
who portray their achievements and prospects in a positive light (Schlenker and Leary 
1982; Leary and Kowalski 1990; Wosinska et al. 1996; Hareli and Weiner 2000). 
Optimism following success can signal to observers that an actor is overconfident 
(Pronin et al. 2002), developing too much confidence in their own abilities and not 
enough sensitivity to environmental challenges and contingencies (Miller and Ross 
1975; Zuckerman 1979; Clapham and Schwenk 1991). Such lay theories about 
optimism will lead investors to believe that optimism blinds managers to important 
environmental challenges and contingencies that they would otherwise recognize (e.g., 
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see Hilary and Menzly 2006; Hilary and Hsu 2011; Billett and Qian 2008; Libby and 
Rennekamp 2012). Accordingly, I predict that when a firm is performing well, 
investors will believe that managers can best achieve success by being more realistic 
and less optimistic about the future. 
2.2 Do Beliefs about the Benefits of Managerial Optimism Affect Investor 
Evaluation of Firms That Focus on Either Challenges or Opportunities in Future-
Oriented Disclosures? 
 
If a firm’s current-period performance shapes investors’ beliefs about the 
benefits of managerial optimism, it may in turn influence how investors evaluate 
elements of future-oriented disclosures. In this paper, I focus on one element of future-
oriented disclosures—whether managers focus on challenges or opportunities when 
discussing the company’s plans and strategies for the future.  
Within future-oriented disclosures, managers can differ in how they frame the 
company’s strategy—managers can frame the strategy as a way to avoid negative 
outcomes that lead to failure and other times frame the strategy as a way to pursue 
positive outcomes that lead to success. Thus, in many future-oriented disclosures, 
managers can hold constant the strategy they will pursue and decide whether to frame 
their strategy as one that helps the company avoid failure (i.e., a challenge-focused 
disclosure) or one that helps the company succeed (i.e., an opportunity-focused 
disclosure). See Appendix A for examples from practice of challenge-focused 
disclosures and opportunity-focused disclosures. 
Although prior research does not examine how investors react to challenge-
focused and opportunity-focused disclosures, it does examine how investors react to 
related constructs. For example, prior archival research uses computer-based content 
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analysis to create broad measures of positive or negative disclosure “tone” in earnings 
releases, 10-Ks, and earnings conference calls (e.g., see Lang and Lundholm 2000; Li 
2010; Rogers, et al. 2011; Davis and Tama-Sweet 2012; Davis et al. 2012; Price, et al. 
2012; Huang et al. 2014; Davis et al. 2015). These measures of disclosure tone are 
intended to capture the extent to which managers focus either on the positive or 
negative in narrative disclosures. This research provides evidence that positive tone is 
associated with a favorable market reaction and favorable future performance, and that 
negative tone is associated with an unfavorable market reaction and unfavorable future 
performance (e.g., see Lang and Lundholm 2000; Henry 2008; Li 2010; Davis et al. 
2012; Price et al. 2012; Davis et al. 2015).  
An inherent challenge with this research is that archival measures of tone are 
very broad, capturing both information about the firm’s past performance and future 
plans (i.e., “content”) and the manner in which firms present that information (i.e., 
“presentation”) (Henry 2008; Davis et al. 2014; Tan et al. 2014). Thus, the positive 
relationship between tone and market reaction may be driven by either content, 
presentation, or both. My study disentangles these constructs by holding constant a 
firm’s future plans and manipulating whether the firm focuses on challenges or 
opportunities when presenting those plans.  
Prior psychology research suggests that investors will interpret opportunity-
focused disclosures as more indicative of optimism and challenge-focused disclosures 
as more indicative of realism. Specifically, prior research provides evidence that 
individuals develop unrealistic optimism by focusing too much on their plans to 
achieve desirable outcomes and not enough on plans to mitigate the many 
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environmental challenges and contingencies that produce undesirable outcomes 
(Buehler et al. 2002).  Thus, someone who is unrealistically optimistic tends to focus 
more on positive outcomes than someone who is realistic.  
Based on this literature, I predict that investors will perceive opportunity-
focused disclosures as conveying a more optimistic outlook about the future and 
challenge-focused disclosures as conveying a more realistic outlook about the future. 
Thus, to the extent that investors believe that managers can best achieve success by 
being more optimistic and less realistic about the future, they will be more willing to 
invest in a firm that focuses on opportunities rather than challenges in future-oriented 
disclosures. In contrast, to the extent that investors believe that managers can best 
achieve success by being more realistic and less optimistic about the future, they will 
be more willing to invest in a firm that focuses on challenges rather than opportunities 
in future-oriented disclosures.  
2.3 Hypotheses 
The above discussion suggests that a firm’s current-period performance shapes 
investors’ beliefs about the benefits of managerial optimism, which in turn shapes how 
investors evaluate firms that focus either on challenges or opportunities in future-
oriented disclosures. My first hypothesis relates to the combined effect of this 
theoretical process. Specifically, I first predict that a firm’s current-period 
performance will shape how investors evaluate firms that focus on  either challenges 
or opportunities in future-oriented disclosures. This prediction is illustrated in Figure 
2, Panel A and stated below:  
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H1: When a firm is performing well (poorly), investors invest more when that 
firm focuses on challenges (opportunities) in future-oriented disclosures 
rather than opportunities (challenges). 
My second two hypotheses relate to the process by which the effect in H1 arises. 
Specifically, I predict that a firm’s current-period performance will shape investors’ 
beliefs about the benefits of managerial optimism (H2), which in turn will shape how 
investors evaluate firms that focus on either challenges or opportunities in future-
oriented disclosures (H3). These predictions are illustrated in Panel A of Figures 3 and 
4, respectively, and are stated below: 
H2: When a firm is performing well (poorly), investors believe that managers 
can best achieve success by being more (less) realistic and less (more) 
optimistic about the future. 
H3: Investors who believe that managers can best achieve success by being 
more realistic and less optimistic (more optimistic and less realistic) about 
the future invest more when the firm focuses on challenges (opportunities) 
in future-oriented disclosures rather than opportunities (challenges).  
 
2.4 Approach to Hypothesis Testing 
Accounting researchers often test a hypothesized process by conducting a 
single study that manipulates independent variable(s) and measures mediating and 
dependent variables (i.e., “mediation-by-measurement”). Spencer et al. (2005) identify 
a number of limitations of testing a psychological process through “mediation-by-
measurement” designs. Two are most important in the current setting. First, measuring 
a mediating variable potentially contaminates measurement of the dependent variable 
of interest (or vice versa). Second, such an approach is correlational in nature and is 
thus susceptible to the possibility that an omitted variable accounts for the observed 
relationships.1 
                                                 
1 Spencer et al. (2005) note four other limitations of the “mediation-by-measurement” approach. First, 
this approach has low power. Second, researchers often choose to measure mediating variables and 
dependent variables that are not conceptually distinct, providing little evidence on the psychological 
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Testing my theory through “mediation-by-measurement” would be particularly 
problematic for my study for two main reasons. First, the nature of my study would 
require me to measure participants’ beliefs about the benefits of optimism after 
participants learn about the firm’s current-period performance but before participants 
read future-oriented disclosures and provide investment judgments. This order of 
measurement would raise concerns that my mediating measures contaminate the 
manner in which participants process future-oriented disclosures and respond to the 
dependent measure. Second, one of my independent variables (current-period 
performance) can potentially impact many different conceptual variables, exacerbating 
the possibility that an omitted variable could explain the correlational evidence 
provided by a “mediation-by-measurement” approach.  
Therefore, I take an alternative approach advocated by Spencer et al. (2005), 
which is to conduct a series of experiments that tests each link in the hypothesized 
causal chain using manipulated independent variables (“mediation-by-manipulation”). 
Figure 1 illustrates the theory underlying my predictions and provides an overview of 
the experiments.  In Experiment 1, I test the effect of the entire process proposed in 
Figure 1 on the dependent variable of interest, without the potential for mediating 
measures contaminating participants’ natural judgment process. In Experiments 2 and 
3, I test each link in the causal chain, which allows me to provide causal evidence on 
the proposed process in Figure 1. I provide details about these experiments below.  
                                                                                                                                            
processes underlying the results. Third, such an approach rarely meets the assumptions required for a 
multiple regression-based analysis. Fourth, such an approach often ignores the possibility that the 
independent variable(s) interact with the mediating variable(s). Mediation by measurement also has 
advantages. For example, “mediation-by-measurement” allows researchers to quantify how much of an 
effect is explained by a measured mediating variable.  Also, it is efficient, allowing mediation to be 
assessed within one experiment rather than across several. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
EXPERIMENT 1  
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants 
 I recruited participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk’s (AMT) online 
marketplace. Libby et al. (2002) recommend matching experimental subjects to the 
goals of an experiment and avoiding using more sophisticated subjects than is 
necessary to achieve an experiment’s goals. My experiments require that participants 
understand only basic investment and accounting concepts (commonly referred to as 
“unsophisticated investors” or “nonprofessional investors” in the literature). Recent 
research suggests that AMT workers are reasonable proxies for unsophisticated 
investors. Specifically Krische (2015) provides evidence that AMT workers do not 
differ on financial literacy scores from a nationally representative sample of investors, 
and that research conducted with MBA students replicates using AMT workers. 
Furthermore, Farrell et al. (2014) provide evidence that AMT workers expend as much 
and sometimes more effort than students receiving higher pay. Given the convenience 
of the AMT marketplace, accounting researchers are increasingly using AMT workers 
as proxies for nonprofessional investors (e.g., see Rennekamp 2012; Asay et al. 2014; 
Jackson et al. 2014; Asay et al. 2015; Koonce et al. in press; Rennekamp et al. in 
press).2  
                                                 
2 In Section VI, I discuss the potential moderating role of financial literacy on my results.  
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One hundred ten individuals complete the experiment in exchange for $1.50 
payment. Following Rennekamp (2012), I recruit participants who live in the United 
States. I exclude three participants who do not live in the United States and do not 
consider English to be their native language but were able to participate due to a 
technical error, leaving a final sample of 107 participants.3  Participants report that 
they, on average, are 31.6 years old, have 10.9 years of work experience, and have 
taken 1.4 accounting and 1.4 finance courses. 69.8% of participants have invested in 
stock in the past, and 81.8% of participants plan on investing in the future.  
3.1.2 Design and Overview 
I conduct a 2x2 between-subjects experiment in which I measure participants’ 
investment decisions and manipulate (1) current-period performance and (2) whether 
investors read challenge-focused or opportunity-focused disclosures.  
Participants assume the role of an investor in ProCom Inc., a fictional firm 
modeled after Pitney Bowes, a publicly-traded firm in the business services industry 
(Emett and Nelson 2016). At the beginning of the experiment, participants are asked to 
assume that they have already invested $10,000 of their savings in ProCom and are 
considering whether to increase, decrease, or maintain this investment.4 They then 
read background information about ProCom and its industry.  
The experiment consists of four phases. In the first phase, participants read 
ProCom’s most recent earnings release and an analyst report. I manipulate earnings 
                                                 
3 Results are very similar when including these three participants. I note below all instances in which 
results differ when including these three participants.  
4 I ask participants to assume the role of current investor rather than prospective investor because this 
allows me to capture investment decisions that can either increase or decrease. Also, current investors 
are among those most likely to read a firm’s earning release and letter to shareholders.  
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news during this phase of the experiment. In the second phase, participants read 
ProCom’s letter to shareholders, which ProCom issued one week after their earnings 
release. I manipulate whether the letter to shareholders focuses on challenges or 
opportunities during this phase of the experiment. In the third phase of the experiment, 
participants provide investment judgments and answer post-experiment questions. In 
the fourth phase of the experiment, participants read the version of the letter to 
shareholders that they did not read in the second phase of the experiment (challenge-
focused or opportunity-focused) and indicate whether their investment judgments 
would have changed had they received this alternative letter to shareholders. I provide 
additional information about these phases of the experiment below.  
3.1.3 Independent Variables 
3.1.3.1 Earning news manipulation.   In phase one of the experiment, 
participants read excerpts from the firm’s earnings announcement and an analyst 
report that follows the earnings announcement. The excerpts focus exclusively on 
ProCom’s current-period performance and do not discuss management’s expectations 
about the future. In the Good News condition, the firm announces current-period 
revenue and earnings that exceed prior-year revenue and earnings. In addition, the 
analyst report announces that ProCom’s earnings exceeded analysts’ consensus 
expectations. In the Bad News condition, the firm announces current-period revenue 
and earnings that fall short of prior-year revenue and earnings. In addition, the analyst 
report announces that ProCom’s earnings fell short of analysts’ consensus 
expectations. (See Appendix B for the experimental materials related to this 
manipulation). 
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3.1.3.2 Disclosure focus manipulation.  In phase two of the experiment, 
participants in all conditions read ProCom’s letter to shareholders, which is modeled 
after actual letters to shareholders by JP Morgan Chase and Pitney Bowes. In the 
letter, ProCom’s CEO announces three strategic initiatives. I manipulate whether these 
strategic initiatives are framed as helping the company avoid negative outcomes that 
lead to failure (challenge-focused) or as helping the company pursue positive 
outcomes that lead to success (opportunity-focused). I do this by manipulating several 
phrases in the letter so that the company describes either challenges or opportunities it 
would like to avoid or pursue. Importantly, both disclosures describe logically 
equivalent initiatives that will lead to logically equivalent outcomes; they differ only 
in their focus on whether the initiative will avoid negative outcomes or obtain positive 
outcomes.5 See Appendix C for experimental materials related to this manipulation. 
By manipulating whether managers frame their future-oriented disclosures as 
focusing on either opportunities or challenges, I create disclosures that prior archival 
literature would categorize as having either a positive or negative disclosure “tone”, 
respectively.  For example, when analyzing the manipulated phrases using Loughran 
and McDonald’s (2011) measure of tone, I find that the manipulated phrases in the 
challenge-focused disclosures have 14 negative words and 2 positive words, whereas 
the manipulated phrases in the opportunity-focused disclosures have 1 negative word 
                                                 
5 In the Results section below, I discuss a supplementary experiment which provides evidence that the 
Disclosure Focus manipulation successfully manipulates participants’ perceptions of the extent to which 
ProCom’s manager focused on positive outcomes vs. negative outcomes, without manipulating 
participants’ perceptions of the three strategic initiatives discussed in the letter. 
 23 
and 14 positive words.6 Thus, challenge-focused (opportunity-focused) disclosures 
appear to vary on commonly-used measures of disclosure tone.  
3.1.4 Dependent Variables 
3.1.4.1 Investment Decision.   In phase three of the experiment, participants are 
asked to make an investment decision. Participants assume that they have already 
invested $10,000 of their personal savings in ProCom Inc. and have another $10,000 
to potentially invest. They then respond to the following question: “Based on the 
disclosures provided, will you increase, decrease, or maintain your investment in 
ProCom?” Participants respond on a slider scale ranging from “Decrease investment 
by $10,000” to “Increase investment by $10,000”. 
3.1.4.2 Post-Experiment Questions.   Participants are then asked to answer a 
series of questions that measure the attributions they make about ProCom’s 
management. Specifically, I ask participants to evaluate ProCom’s management on 
three dimensions: (1) competence, (2) trustworthiness, and (3) risk calibration. For 
competence, participants indicate how competent or incompetent they believe the 
management of ProCom to be on a 101-point scale ranging from “Very Incompetent” 
to “Very Competent”. For trustworthiness, participants indicate how trustworthy or 
untrustworthy they believe the management of ProCom to be on a 101-point scale 
                                                 
6 Although the Loughran and McDonald (LM) dictionary categorizes the challenge-focused 
(opportunity-focused) phrases as having two negative words (one positive word), the phrases in 
question clearly describe negative (positive) outcomes. For example, in the challenge-focused phrase 
“less able”, LM’s dictionary counts “able” as being a positive word, despite the fact that the modifier 
“less” negates the positivity of the word “able”. Similarly, in the opportunity-focused phrase “seize 
opportunities”, LM’s dictionary counts the word “seize” as being a negative word because LM’s 
dictionary focuses on the negative meaning of the homophone seize, whereas my usage is not negative. 
Thus, although Loughran and McDonald’s dictionary captures the extent to which my challenge-
focused disclosures focus on the negative and my opportunity-focused disclosures focus on the positive, 
it does so imperfectly. 
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ranging from “Very Untrustworthy” to “Very Trustworthy”. For risk calibration, 
participants indicate whether they think the management of ProCom is taking too 
many risks,  not taking enough risks, or is taking an appropriate number of risks on a 
101-point scale, ranging from “Not taking enough risks” to “Taking too many risks,” 
with “Taking an appropriate number of risks” as the midpoint.   
Next, participants answer five questions adapted from Carver and White’s 
(1994) behavioral activation scale to gauge participants’ mood and motivation.7 As 
discussed below, I use these questions, in conjunction with a supplementary 
experiment, to rule out alternative theoretical explanations for my results. 
 3.1.4.3 Investment Decision Re-Assessment.   In phase four of the experiment, 
participants read the version of the letter to shareholders that they did not see in phase 
two of the experiment (either challenge-focused or opportunity-focused) and re-assess 
their investment decision. Participants again respond on a slider scale ranging from 
“Decrease investment by $10,000” to “Increase investment by $10,000”, with the 
response scale anchored on participants’ original judgment.  Participants are told: 
“The scale below shows your investment decision under the original letter to 
shareholders. Please adjust it if your judgment would differ under the alternative letter 
to shareholders.”  Participants finish the experiment by answering demographic 
questions. 
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Manipulation Checks and Other Construct Tests 
                                                 
7 Specifically participants indicated the extent to which the following statements described how they felt 
at that moment: (1) I feel excited and energized, (2) I feel like I’m doing well at something and would 
love to keep at it, (3) I feel like going out of my way to get things I want, (4) I feel like going all-out to 
get things I want, and (5) I feel like using a “no holds barred” approach to go after things I want. 
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I conduct manipulation checks and other construct checks with two 
supplementary experiments. I conduct these checks in supplementary experiments 
rather than post-experimentally because doing so allows me to examine how each 
manipulation in isolation affects the construct of interest, without contaminating 
participants’ interpretation of the manipulations. Each of the supplementary 
experiments proceeds exactly as described above, except that participants are exposed 
to only one of the manipulations (i.e., either the Earnings News manipulation or the 
Disclosure Focus Manipulation) rather than both manipulations, and then immediately 
respond to the manipulation checks and other construct checks discussed below. 
 3.2.1.1 Earnings news manipulation.    After reading the earnings release and 
analyst report that contains the Earnings News manipulation, participants respond to a 
question that asks them to characterize ProCom’s performance during the year as good 
or bad. Participants respond on a 101-point slider scale ranging from “Bad” to 
“Good”, with the midpoint anchored at “Neither good nor bad”. An untabulated 
analysis confirms that participants assigned to the bad news condition characterize 
ProCom’s performance as worse than do participants assigned to the good news 
condition [t(57)=9.97; p-value<0.001]. Participants in the bad news condition on 
average characterize ProCom’s performance as lower than the midpoint [Mean 
difference from midpoint: 21.3; t(29) = 6.59; p-value < 0.001]. Participants in the 
good news condition on average characterize ProCom’s performance as higher than 
the midpoint [Mean difference from midpoint: 25.7; t(28) = 7.49; p-value < 0.001]. 
These analyses suggest that the Earnings News manipulation was successful. 
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 3.2.1.2 Disclosure focus manipulation.   After reading the shareholder letter 
that contains the Disclosure Focus manipulation, participants respond to four 
questions. The first question asks participants whether, in the shareholder letter, 
ProCom focuses more on positive outcomes that ProCom would like to achieve or 
negative outcomes that ProCom would like to avoid. Participants respond on a 101-
point slider scale ranging from “Negative outcomes that ProCom would like to avoid” 
to “Positive outcomes that ProCom would like to achieve”. As expected, participants 
assigned to the opportunity-focused condition rate the letter as more focused (less 
focused) on positive outcomes (negative outcomes) than do participants assigned to 
the challenge-focused condition [t(61)=5.25; p-value<0.001].  
Participants then respond to three questions designed to capture the extent to 
which the Disclosure Focus manipulation affected participants’ interpretation of 
ProCom’s future plans. As discussed above, I take steps to manipulate the presentation 
of ProCom’s shareholder letter without manipulating the content of ProCom’s future 
plans. To ensure that I am successful in this regard, I ask participants three questions 
about the three strategic initiatives announced by ProCom in the shareholder letter.8 
Participants indicate the extent to which they believe ProCom will pursue these 
initiatives on a 101-point scale ranging from “Definitely will not pursue this initiative” 
to “Definitely will pursue this initiative”. Untabulated analyses confirm that 
participants assigned to the challenge-focused condition do not differ from participants 
assigned to the opportunity-focused condition in their responses to any of the three 
                                                 
8 The three strategic initiatives described in these questions are: (1) “invest in new digital technologies”, 
(2) “cut unnecessary expenditures and make only necessary expenditures”, and (3) “exit auxiliary 
businesses that are unprofitable”.  
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questions (all p-values > 0.10). Overall, these analyses suggest that the Disclosure 
Focus manipulation successfully manipulates the presentation of ProCom’s future 
plans without affecting the content of those future plans.  
3.2.2 Tests of Hypotheses  
Experiment 1 tests the effect of the overall process outlined in Figure 1 and 
predicted in H1, which states that when a firm is performing well (poorly), investors 
will invest more when that firm focuses on challenges (opportunities) in future-
oriented disclosures rather than opportunities (challenges). I test this hypothesis by 
conducting a 2 x 2 ANOVA with Earnings News and Disclosure Focus as the 
independent variables and investment decision as the dependent variable. I report 
descriptive statistics for participants’ investment decisions in Table 1, Panel A, and 
plot mean investment decisions in Figure 2, Panel B.  
As shown in Figure 2, Panel A, H1 predicts that Earnings News and 
Disclosure Focus interact to influence investors’ investment decisions. Table 1, Panel 
B provides the results of an ANOVA with investment decision as the dependent 
variable and Earnings News and Disclosure Focus as the independent variables. As 
seen in the table, the predicted interaction is significant (p-value = 0.004, one-tailed).  
This result provides support for my prediction in H1. 
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Figure 2. Experiment 1 Predictions and Results 
 
Panel A: Experiment 1 Predictions 
 
 
Panel A: Experiment 1 Results 
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates predictions and results for Experiment 1. In the experiment, 107 individuals assume 
the role of investor, read a firm’s earnings release and letter to shareholder, and make an investment 
decision. I manipulate whether the firm reports bad or good news in its earnings release (see Appendix 
B) and whether the firm focuses on challenges or opportunities in its letter to shareholders (see 
Appendix C).  Participants indicate whether, based on the disclosures provided, they will increase, 
decrease, or maintain their investment in the firm, on a scale from “Decrease by $10,000” to “Increase 
by $10,000”. 
 
 
 29 
Table 1. Experiment 1 Results 
 
 
Panel A: Mean investment [median] (standard deviation) 
             
    
Disclosure Focus Condition 
 
    
Challenge-
Focused 
Disclosure 
 
Opportunity-
Focused 
Disclosure 
 
Total 
 
E
ar
ni
ng
s N
ew
s C
on
di
tio
n 
Bad News 
 
-$2,105 
 
-$259 
 
-$1,148 
 
 
[-$2,401] 
 
[$0] 
 
[-$897] 
 
 
($3,885) 
 
($3,121) 
 
($3,598) 
 
 
n=26 
 
n=28 
 
n=54 
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
Good News 
 
$4,189 
 
$2,411 
 
$3,317 
 
 
[$5,000] 
 
[$2,582] 
 
[$3,070] 
 
 
($2,694) 
 
($4,171) 
 
($3,577) 
 
 
n=27 
 
n=26 
 
n=53 
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
Total 
 
$1,102 
 
$1,026 
 
$1,064 
 
 
[$1,121] 
 
[$465] 
 
[$1,002] 
 
 
($4,580) 
 
($3,871) 
 
($4,217) 
 
 
n=53 
 
n=54 
 
n=107 
 
 
             
           
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance 
                 
  
Source 
 
d.f. 
 
F-Statistic 
 
p-value 
 
  
Earnings News 
 
1 
 
43.46 
 
<0.001 
 
  
Disclosure Focus 
 
1 
 
0.01 
 
0.937 
 
  
Earnings News * Disclosure Focus 
 
1 
 
7.15 
 
0.004 
           
 
        
 
 
Panel C: Follow-Up Simple Effects 
                
  
Test 
 
t-statistic 
 
p-value 
 
  
Effect of Focus When News is Bad 
 
-1.93 
 
0.028 
 
  
Effect of Focus When News is Good 
 
1.85 
 
0.034 
                
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and analyses for Experiment 1. In the experiment, 107 investors assume the 
role of investor, read a firm’s earnings release and letter to shareholder, and make an investment decision. I 
manipulate whether the firm reports bad or good news in its earnings release (see Appendix B) and whether the firm 
focuses on challenges or opportunities in its letter to shareholders (see Appendix C).  Participants indicate whether, 
based on the disclosures provided, they will increase, decrease, or maintain their investment in the firm, on a scale 
from “Decrease by $10,000” to “Increase by $10,000”. Bolded p-values are one-sided equivalent p-values, given my 
directional predictions.  
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Table 1, Panel C provides tests of the simple effects predicted in H1. Results 
indicate that, when news is bad, participants invest more in a firm that focuses on 
opportunities rather than challenges (p-value = 0.028, one-tailed).9 Results also 
indicate that, when news is good, participants invest more in a firm that focuses on 
challenges rather than opportunities (p-value = 0.034, one-tailed). Thus, the specific 
pattern of results in Experiment 1 is consistent with that predicted in H1 and depicted 
in Figure 2, Panel A.  
3.2.3 Additional Analysis 
 3.2.3.1 Ruling Out Alternative Explanations.  My theory attributes the 
interaction between Earnings News and Disclosure Focus as driven by investors’ 
beliefs about the benefits of unrealistic managerial optimism. As a supplementary 
analysis, I analyze whether Earnings News and Disclosure Focus instead jointly 
impact participants’ attributions about the competence, trustworthiness, or risk 
calibration of ProCom’s management. To do this, I conduct separate ANOVAs with 
Earnings News and Disclosure Focus as independent variables and competence, trust, 
and risk calibration as dependent variables. Untabulated results indicate no significant 
interaction between Earnings News and Disclosure Focus for any of these three 
variables (all p-values > 0.10).10 Thus, the interactive effect of Earnings News and 
                                                 
9 When I include the three participants who do not live in the United States and do not speak English in 
the analysis, this test of simple effects reveals a marginally significant interaction (p=0.055, one-tailed). 
All other results are inferentially identical. 
10 These analyses do indicate some significant main effects.  As would be expected, participants view 
ProCom’s management as more competent and trustworthy when the firm reports good news than when 
the firm reports bad news (p-value < 0.001). Interestingly, participants also view ProCom’s 
management as more trustworthy when they focus on challenges than when they focus on opportunities 
(p-value = 0.001).  
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Disclosure Focus documented above does not appear to operate through investors’ 
attributions about management’s competence, trust, or risk calibration.  
 An alternative possibility is that current-period performance shapes investors’ 
mood and/ or “regulatory focus” (i.e., the extent to which people are sensitive to the 
presence or absence of gains, see Higgins 2000), which in turn shapes how investors 
process future-oriented disclosures. I investigate these possibilities in two ways. First, 
I conduct a supplementary experiment in which I manipulate Earnings News and 
measure participants’ regulatory focus with Higgins et al’s (2001) Regulatory Focus 
Questionnaire. Untabulated results indicate no significant effect of Earnings News on 
participants’ regulatory focus. Second, I conduct a 2 x 2 ANOVA with Earnings News 
and Disclosure Focus as independent variables and a composite measure of 
participants’ mood/ motivation as the dependent variable. Untabulated results indicate 
no significant main effect of Earnings News or interaction between Earnings News 
and Disclosure Focus. Thus, the interactive effect of Earnings News and Disclosure 
Focus does not appear to operate through participants’ mood and/or regulatory focus.  
3.2.3.2 Investment Decision Re-Assessment.   In phase four of the experiment, 
participants view the letter to shareholders that they did not view during the main part 
of the experiment (either a challenge-focused disclosure or opportunity-focused 
disclosure) and are asked to re-assess their investment decision assuming they had 
received the alternative disclosure. I measure participants’ change in investment 
decision from these two phases of the task. To the extent that investors are aware that 
a firm’s current-period performance shapes how they evaluate future-oriented 
disclosures, I would expect to see Earnings News and Disclosure Focus jointly impact 
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the change in participants’ investment decisions. In particular, I would expect that 
when news is bad, participants who originally saw an opportunity-focused (challenge-
focused) disclosure are more likely to decrease (increase) their investment when they 
see a challenge-focused (opportunity-focused) disclosure during phase 4 of the 
experiment. In contrast, I would expect that when news is good, participants who 
originally saw an opportunity-focused (challenge-focused) disclosure are more likely 
to increase (decrease) their investment when they see a challenge-focused 
(opportunity-focused) disclosure during phase 4 of the experiment.  
I conduct an ANOVA with Earnings News and Disclosure Focus as 
independent variables and the change in participants’ investment decisions as the 
dependent variable. Untabulated analyses reveal a marginally significant interaction 
(p-value = 0.073, two-tailed). The pattern of this interaction is consistent with 
participants being aware that a firm’s current-period performance shapes how they 
evaluate future-oriented disclosure. However, it also provides some evidence that 
participants are not aware of the full extent of this effect. In particular, this interaction 
is smaller and weaker than the one documented in Table 1, suggesting that participants 
do not fully adjust for the effect documented above.  
To provide additional insight on whether participants are aware of the full 
extent to which current-period performance shapes how they evaluate future-oriented 
disclosures, I examine participants’ raw investment decisions from the re-assessment 
phase of the task. To the extent that participants are fully aware of the predicted 
influence, I would expect to see an interaction between Earnings News and Disclosure 
Focus in the opposite pattern of the one seen in Figure 2 and tested in Table 1. 
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However, untabulated analyses reveal that this interaction is not significant (p-value > 
0.10). This result again provides evidence that participants are not aware of the full 
extent to which a firm’s current-period performance influences how they respond to 
future-oriented disclosures.
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CHAPTER 4 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
Experiment 2 tests the first link in the causal chain depicted in Figure 1. In 
particular, Experiment 2 tests whether a firm’s current-period performance shapes 
investors’ beliefs about the benefits of managerial optimism. 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants 
 I recruited participants from the AMT online marketplace. Fifty-nine 
individuals complete the experiment in exchange for $0.75 payment.11 These 
participants, on average, report that they are 33.0 years old, have 12.7 years of work 
experience, and have taken 1.5 accounting and 1.3 finance courses. 58.6% of 
participants have invested in stock in the past, and 72.9% of participants plan on 
investing in the future. I create worker qualifications in AMT to ensure that AMT 
workers do not participate in more than one of the related experiments discussed in 
this paper.  
4.1.2 Design and Overview 
I conduct a 1x2 between-subjects experiment in which I manipulate current-
period performance and measure participants’ beliefs about the benefits of managerial 
optimism.   
                                                 
11 Compensation differed between the three experiments because the experiments differ in length. I 
attempted to pay participants the same amount per unit of time across the three experiments.  
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The beginning of Experiment 2 is identical to that of Experiment 1. 
Participants assume the role of an investor in ProCom and are asked to assume that 
they have already invested $10,000 of their savings in ProCom and are considering 
whether to increase, decrease, or maintain this investment. They then read background 
information about ProCom and its industry.  
The experiment consists of two phases. In the first phase, participants read 
ProCom’s most recent earnings release and analyst report. This phase is identical to 
the first phase in Experiment 1. In the second phase of the experiment, participants 
provide judgments about the benefits of managerial optimism.  
4.1.3 Independent Variables 
4.1.3.1 Earning News Manipulation.   The earnings news manipulation is the 
same as the one used in Experiment 1.  
4.1.4 Dependent Variable 
4.1.4.1 Beliefs about the Benefits of Managerial Optimism.   Participants 
answer two questions that together measure participants’ beliefs about whether 
ProCom’s management can best achieve success by being more or less optimistic 
about the future. I model these questions after questions used by Tenney et al. (2015) 
to capture an identical construct. Tenney et al. (2015) validate their measure using 
other measures of this construct, and argue that their measure more precisely captures 
the construct of interest than other available measures.12 Participants are first 
                                                 
12 In particular, Tenney et al. (2015) replicate their research with a measure used by Armor et al. (2008) 
to capture prescriptions for optimism. Armor et al. (2008) ask participants whether it would be best for 
a protagonist to be optimistic or pessimistic about their chances of success on a scale from -4 
(extremely pessimistic) through 0 (accurate) to 4 (extremely optimistic). Tenney et al. (2015) argue that 
their measure is preferred over the Armor et al. (2008) measure because it “allows [the authors] to ask 
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prompted to answer the following question: “Taking into account ProCom’s recent 
performance, what do you think is the likelihood that ProCom management will 
achieve success in the upcoming year”. Participants use a slider to indicate their 
answer on a 101-point scale ranging from 0% chance of success to 100% chance of 
success. Participants then are prompted to answer the following question: “You 
indicated on the previous page that you think ProCom management’s true chance of 
success in the upcoming year is [X]%. In order to be successful, what should ProCom 
management think is their true chance of success in the upcoming year?” Participants 
use the same scale to respond as before, and I subtract the first measure from the 
second as a measure of participants’ beliefs about the benefits of managerial optimism. 
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Tests of Hypotheses  
Experiment 2 tests the first link in the causal chain depicted in Figure 1. In 
particular, Experiment 2 tests whether investors believe that managers can best 
achieve success by being more realistic and less optimistic about the future when a 
firm is performing well and believe that managers can best achieve success by being 
more optimistic and less realistic about the future when a firm is performing poorly, as 
predicted in H2 and shown in Figure 2, Panel A. 
I test this hypothesis by conducting a 1 x 2 ANOVA with Earnings News as 
the independent variable and participants’ beliefs about the benefits of managerial 
optimism as the dependent variable. Table 2, Panel A reports descriptive statistics for 
                                                                                                                                            
participants precisely how much optimism they prescribe” and “allows [the authors] to compare 
participants’ prescriptions with an accuracy standard [the accuracy standard that participants themselves 
provide]” (p. 379). 
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participants’ beliefs about the benefits of managerial optimism. The first two columns 
in Table 2, Panel A report descriptive statistics for the two questions that allow me to 
measure participants’ beliefs about the benefits of managerial optimism, and the final 
column reports descriptive statistics for participants’ beliefs about the benefits of 
managerial optimism. I plot participants’ beliefs about the benefits of managerial 
optimism by experimental condition in Figure 3, Panel B. 
H2 predicts that Earnings News will influence participants’ beliefs about the 
benefits of managerial optimism. Table 2, Panel B provides the results of an ANOVA 
with Earnings News as the independent variable and beliefs about the benefits of 
managerial optimism as the dependent variable. As seen in the table, the predicted 
main effect of Earnings News is significant (p-value < 0.001, one-tailed).  Participants 
believe that managers can best achieve success by being more optimistic and less 
realistic when the firm reports bad news and believe that the firm can best achieve 
success by being more realistic and less optimistic when the firm reports good news. 
These results support my prediction in H2.  
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Figure 3. Experiment 2 Predictions and Results 
 
Panel A: Experiment 2 Predictions 
 
 
 
Panel B: Experiment 2 Results 
 
Figure 3 illustrates predictions and results for Experiment 2. In the experiment, 59 individuals assume 
the role of investor, read a firm’s earnings release, and make judgments about the benefits of 
managerial optimism. I manipulate whether the firm reports bad or good news in its earnings release 
(see Appendix B).  After reading the earnings release, participants indicate what they think is the 
likelihood that ProCom management will achieve success in the upcoming year, on a scale from “0% 
chance of success” to “100% chance of success”. Participants then indicate what firm management, in 
order to be successful, should think is their true chance of success in the upcoming year, on the same 
scale. I subtract the first measure from the second as a measure of participants’ beliefs about whether 
managers can best achieve success by being optimistic or realistic about the future.
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Table 2. Experiment 2 Results 
 
 
Panel A: Mean response [median] (standard deviation) 
             
    
Dependent Measure 
 
    
What is 
ProCom’s 
true chance 
of success? 
(A) 
 
To be 
successful, 
what should 
ProCom 
management 
think is the true 
chance of 
success? 
(B) 
 
Belief in the 
benefits of 
managerial 
optimism 
(B - A) 
 
E
ar
ni
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s N
ew
s C
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tio
n 
Bad News 
 
43.4% 
 
65.6% 
 
22.3% 
 
 
[40.0%] 
 
[72.0%] 
 
[18.5%] 
 
 
(18.6%) 
 
($28.5%) 
 
(26.3%) 
 
 
n=30 
 
n=30 
 
n=30 
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
Good News 
 
72.2% 
 
73.6% 
 
1.4% 
 
 
[73.0%] 
 
[76.0%] 
 
[0.0%] 
 
 
(9.8%) 
 
(16.5%) 
 
(14.9%) 
 
 
n=29 
 
n=29 
 
n=29 
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
Total 
 
57.6% 
 
69.6% 
 
12.0% 
 
 
[61.0%] 
 
[75.0%] 
 
[9.0%] 
 
 
(20.8%) 
 
(23.5%) 
 
(23.7%) 
 
 
n=59 
 
n=59 
 
n=59 
 
 
             
           
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance 
                 
  
Source 
 
d.f. 
 
F-Statistic 
 
p-value 
 
  
Earnings News 
 
1 
 
13.97 
 
<0.001 
                  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and analyses for Experiment 2. In the experiment, 59 individuals assume the 
role of investor, read a firm’s earnings release, and make judgments about the benefits of managerial optimism. I 
manipulate whether the firm reports bad or good news in its earnings release (see Appendix B).  After reading the 
earnings release, participants indicate what they think is the likelihood that ProCom management will achieve 
success in the upcoming year, on a scale from “0% chance of success” to “100% chance of success”. Participants 
then indicate what firm management, in order to be successful, should think is their true chance of success in the 
upcoming year, on the same scale. I subtract the first measure from the second as a measure of participants’ beliefs 
about whether managers can best achieve success by being optimistic or realistic about the future. Bolded p-values 
are one-sided equivalent p-values, given my directional predictions.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
 
Experiment 3 tests the second link in the causal chain depicted in Figure 1. 
Specifically, Experiment 3 tests whether investors’ beliefs about the benefits of 
managerial optimism shape how investors evaluate firms that focus on either 
challenges or opportunities in future-oriented disclosures.   
5.1 Method 
5.1.1 Participants 
 I recruited participants from the AMT online marketplace. One hundred 
fourteen individuals complete the experiment in exchange for $1.00 payment. I 
exclude six individuals who spend little time reading my narrative-based 
manipulations, leaving me with a final sample of 108 individuals.13 These participants, 
on average, report that they are 32.2 years old, have 11.9 years of work experience, 
and have taken 1.7 accounting and 1.3 finance courses. 65.7% of participants have 
invested in stock in the past, and 86.1% of participants plan on investing in the future. 
As noted above, I create worker qualifications in AMT to ensure that AMT workers 
can only participate in one of the experiments discussed in this paper. 
5.1.2 Design and Overview 
                                                 
13 These participants, on average, spend one minute and eighteen seconds on the entire experiment, 
including the portion of the experiment where they read background information, make an investment 
decision, and answer the 9 demographic questions at the end of the experiment. Thus, it’s unlikely these 
participants were able to completely process my narrative-based manipulations. However, results are 
very similar when including these participants. I note below all instances in which results differ when 
including these six participants. 
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I conduct a 2x2 between-subjects experiment in which I measure participants’ 
investment decisions and manipulate (1) participants’ beliefs about the benefits of 
managerial optimism and (2) whether investors read challenge-focused or opportunity-
focused disclosures.  
The beginning of Experiment 3 is identical to that of Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2. Participants assume the role of an investor in ProCom and are asked to 
assume that they have already invested $10,000 of their savings in ProCom and are 
considering whether to increase decrease, or maintain this investment. They then read 
background information about ProCom and its industry.  
The experiment consists of three phases. In the first phase, participants read an 
article describing the benefits of either managerial optimism or managerial realism. I 
use this phase of the experiment to manipulate participants’ beliefs about whether 
managers can best achieve success by being more or less optimistic about the future. 
In the second phase, participants read ProCom’s letter to shareholders, which focuses 
either on challenges or opportunities. This phase of the experiment is identical to the 
second phase of Experiment 1. In the third phase of the experiment, participants make 
an investment decision. I provide additional information about these phases of the 
experiment below.  
5.1.3 Independent Variables 
5.1.3.1 Beliefs manipulation.   In order to manipulate investors’ beliefs about 
the benefits of managerial optimism, I need to manipulate their beliefs about whether 
managers can best achieve success by being more or less optimistic about the future. 
To do this, I assign participants to either read an article describing the benefits of 
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managerial optimism or to read an article describing the benefits of managerial 
realism. I model these articles after actual articles available on the web 
(www.entrepreneur.com/article/231549 for optimism and www.inc.com/millennial-
entrepreneurs/why-the-best-entrepreneurs-are-closet-pessimists.html for realism.) 14 
See Appendix D for experimental materials related to this manipulation.  
5.1.3.2 Disclosure focus manipulation.  The disclosure focus manipulation is 
identical to the one described above for Experiment 1.  
5.1.4 Dependent Variables 
5.1.4.1 Investment Decision.   In phase three of the experiment, participants are 
asked to make an investment decision. This measure is identical to the one described 
above for Experiment 1. 
5.2 Results 
5.2.1 Tests of Hypotheses  
Experiment 3 tests the second link of the causal chain depicted in Figure 1. 
Specifically, Experiment 3 tests whether investors who believe that managers can best 
achieve success by being more (less) optimistic about the future invest more when the 
firm focuses on opportunities (challenges) in future-oriented disclosures rather than 
challenges (opportunities), as predicted in H3 and shown in Figure 4, Panel A. I test 
this hypothesis by conducting a 2 x 2 ANOVA with Beliefs and Disclosure Focus as 
the independent variables and investment decision as the dependent variable. I report 
                                                 
14 Note that I manipulate participants’ beliefs about the benefits of optimism by exposing participants to 
different persuasive arguments, not by deceiving them. The statements made in each of the articles are 
based on peer-reviewed research on optimism and emotion. The quotes in the articles are taken from 
articles available on the web. Thus, both of the articles included in this experiment present fact-based 
persuasive arguments about the benefits of managerial optimism.  
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descriptive statistics for participants’ investment decisions in Table 3, Panel A, and 
plot mean investment decisions in Figure 4, Panel B.  
H3 predicts that Beliefs and Disclosure Focus will interact to influence 
investors’ investment decisions. Table 3, Panel B provides the results of an ANOVA 
with Beliefs and Disclosure Focus as the independent variables and investment 
decision as the dependent variable. As seen in the table, the predicted interaction is 
significant (p-value = 0.026, one-tailed).15  This result suggest that investors’ beliefs 
about the benefits of managerial optimism shape how investors evaluate firms that 
focus on either challenges or opportunities in future-oriented disclosures. 
Table 3, Panel C provides tests of the simple effects predicted in H3. Results 
indicate that participants invest more in a firm that focuses on opportunities rather than 
challenges after reading an article describing the benefits of managerial optimism (p-
value = <0.001, one-tailed). However, results do not indicate that participants invest 
more in a firm that focuses on challenges rather than opportunities after reading an 
article describing the benefits of managerial realism (p-value = 0.575). I conjecture 
that this latter result may have occurred because people generally have very strong lay 
beliefs that optimism is beneficial (Tenney et al. 2015), and the article describing the 
benefits of realism decreased but did not completely eliminate participants’ beliefs that 
managerial optimism is beneficial.  The results of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 
suggest that a firm’s good current-period performance is more effective at completely 
eliminating participants’ beliefs about the benefits of managerial optimism. 
                                                 
15 When I include the six participants who spent very little time reading my narrative-based 
manipulations, this test yields a marginally–significant interaction (p-value = 0.058, one-tailed). All 
other results are inferentially identical.   
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Figure 4. Experiment 3 Predictions and Results 
 
Panel A: Experiment 3 Predictions 
 
 
Panel B: Experiment 3 Results 
 
 
Figure 4 illustrates predictions and results for Experiment 3. In the experiment, 108 individuals assume 
the role of investor, read an article about optimism and a firm’s letter to shareholder, and make an 
investment decision. I manipulate participants’ beliefs about the benefits of managerial optimism by 
asking them to read an article describing the benefits of either managerial optimism or managerial 
realism (see Appendix D). I also manipulate whether the firm focuses on challenges or opportunities in 
its letter to shareholders (see Appendix C).  Participants indicate whether, based on the disclosures 
provided, they will increase, decrease, or maintain their investment in the firm, on a scale from 
“Decrease by $10,000” to “Increase by $10,000”.
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Table 3. Experiment 3 Results 
 
 
Panel A: Mean investment [median] (standard deviation) 
             
    
Disclosure Focus Condition 
 
    
Challenge-
Focused 
Disclosure 
 
Opportunity-
Focused 
Disclosure 
 
Total 
 
B
el
ie
fs
 C
on
di
tio
n 
Managerial Optimism is Beneficial 
 
$359 
 
$3,823 
 
$1,993 
 
 
[$814] 
 
[$4,359] 
 
[$2,000] 
 
 
($3,657) 
 
($3,546) 
 
($3,974) 
 
 
n=28 
 
n=25 
 
n=53 
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
Managerial Realism is Beneficial   
 
$1,986 
 
$2,563  
 
$2,290  
 
 
[$1,548] 
 
[$2,977] 
 
[$2,698] 
 
 
($3,700) 
 
($4,200) 
 
($3,946) 
 
 
n=26 
 
n=29 
 
n=55 
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
Total 
 
$1,142  
 
$3,146  
 
$2,144  
 
 
[$992] 
 
[$3,349] 
 
[$2,294] 
 
 
($3,734) 
 
($3,926) 
 
($3,944) 
 
 
n=54 
 
n=54 
 
n=108 
 
 
             
           
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance 
                 
  
Source 
 
d.f. 
 
F-Statistic 
 
p-value 
 
  
Beliefs 
 
1 
 
0.06 
 
0.802 
 
  
Disclosure Focus 
 
1 
 
7.62 
 
0.007 
 
  
Beliefs * Disclosure Focus 
 
1 
 
3.89 
 
0.026 
           
 
        
 
 
Panel C: Follow-Up Simple Effects 
                 
  
Test 
 
t-statistic 
 
p-value 
 
  
Effect of Focus When Managerial Optimism is Beneficial 
 
-3.32 
 
<0.001 
 
  
Effect of Focus When Managerial Realism is Beneficial 
 
-0.56 
 
0.575 
                
Table 3 illustrates predictions and results for Experiment 3. In the experiment, 108 individuals assume the role of 
investor, read an article about optimism and a firm’s letter to shareholder, and make an investment decision. I 
manipulate participants’ beliefs about the benefits of managerial optimism (see Appendix D) and whether the firm 
focuses on challenges or opportunities in its letter to shareholders (see Appendix C).  Participants indicate whether, 
based on the disclosures provided, they will increase, decrease, or maintain their investment in the firm, on a scale 
from “Decrease by $10,000” to “Increase by $10,000”. Bolded p-values are one-sided equivalent p-values, given my 
directional predictions.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Prior archival research implies that managers can best persuade investors by 
focusing on positive outcomes and not focusing on negative outcomes.  I complement 
that research by testing whether investors’ reactions to future-oriented disclosures that 
focus on positive and negative outcomes depend on how a firm is performing in the 
current period.  
I argue that a firm’s current-period performance shapes investors’ beliefs about 
the benefits of managerial optimism, which in turn shapes how investors respond to 
future-oriented disclosures that focus on either positive outcomes (opportunities) or 
negative outcomes (challenges). I conduct a series of experiments that test this 
theoretical model. Experiment 1 tests the overall model, and Experiments 2 and 3 test 
each link in the model’s causal chain.  
Results support my predictions. When a firm is performing poorly, investors 
believe that managers can best achieve success by being more optimistic and less 
realistic about the future. Accordingly, investors are more willing to invest in poorly-
performing firms that focus on opportunities rather than challenges in future-oriented 
disclosures. When a firm is performing well, on the other hand, investors believe that 
managers can best achieve success by being more realistic and less optimistic about 
the future. Accordingly, investors are more willing to invest in well-performing firms 
that focus on challenges rather than opportunities in future-oriented disclosures.  
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 The experiments in this study abstract away from practice settings in order to 
emphasize the constructs that are directly relevant to my theoretical model and de-
emphasize those that are not directly relevant (Bloomfield et al. 2015). Although this 
approach to testing theory allows me to provide strong causal evidence, it opens 
avenues for future research that tests the generality of my theoretical model. For 
example, my experiments use non-professional investors who make investment 
judgments based on limited firm information. Prior research provides evidence that 
financial literacy moderates investors’ reactions to tone in disclosures of past 
performance (Tan et al. 2014). Thus, future research may wish to also examine how 
financial literacy moderates investors’ reactions to the interaction of past performance 
and tone in future-oriented disclosures. In addition, my experiments use a one-period 
setting in which investors have little opportunity to learn whether their beliefs about 
the benefits of managerial optimism are justified, and modify their behavior 
accordingly. Future research can examine the extent to which a multi-period setting 
allows investors to recognize and modify their intuitive judgments about the benefits 
of managerial optimism.    
 My experiments focus on a specific setting in order to disentangle constructs 
that prior archival research does not disentangle. In particular, I examine a setting in 
which managers discuss their plans and strategies for the future. I believe that two 
attributes of this setting are key in driving my predictions and results. First, in my 
setting managers discuss the future and not the past. My predictions rely on theories 
about optimism, which is an inherently forward-looking construct. Accordingly, my 
results do not generalize to settings in which managers discuss the past rather than the 
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future (e.g., see Tan et al. 2014).  Second, in my setting managers discuss their plans 
for altering controllable aspects of performance and do not discuss their predictions 
about uncontrollable aspects of performance. My hypotheses rely on theories about 
how managerial optimism can lead managers to neglect controllable aspects of 
performance. Accordingly, my results may not generalize to settings in which mangers 
discuss their predictions about uncontrollable aspects of performance. Future research 
can examine how investors respond in settings that differ from mine in these respects.  
 By conducting a series of experiments that tests each link in the hypothesized 
causal chain, I am able to provide strong evidence on one causal path that contributes 
to the effect observed in Experiment 1. However, an inherent limitation of this 
approach is that I cannot rule out the possibility that other causal paths may also 
contribute to the effect observed in Figure 1. Future research can explore whether 
other such causal paths exist, as well as the relative importance of potential competing 
causal paths in explaining the observed effect. 
 Future research can also examine how a firm’s current-period performance 
shapes how investors evaluate other elements of future-oriented disclosures. My paper 
focuses on how investors react to one element of future-oriented disclosures—whether 
firms focus on challenges or opportunities. However, the theory presented in this 
paper applies to other elements of future-oriented disclosures, such as vocal emotion 
in conference calls (Mayew and Venkatachalam 2012) and other nonverbal behavior 
in rich disclosure settings (e.g., Blankespoor et al. 2015).   
Overall, this paper makes five main contributions to the accounting, finance 
and psychology literatures. First, it challenges a notion in the accounting and finance 
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literatures that investors always react positively to “positive” disclosure tone and 
negatively to “negative” disclosure tone (Lang and Lundholm 2000; Henry 2008; Li 
2010; Davis et al. 2012; Price et al. 2012; Davis et al. 2015). While prior research 
identifies a main effect of tone, I provide evidence that tone interacts with a key 
environmental factor – current-period performance. Although archival measures of 
tone would categorize my manipulation as capturing “positive” or “negative” tone, my 
results diverge from the main finding in the archival literature.  In particular, I provide 
evidence of circumstances in which investors predictably react positively to negative 
tone and negatively to positive tone. Also, as noted above, archival measures of tone 
capture both the content and presentation of a firm’s past performance and future 
plans, whereas I disentangle these constructs and focus on the presentation of a firm’s 
future plans. Thus, my results suggest that the broad measures of tone used in prior 
archival research may mask how investors react to the manner in which firms present 
their plans and strategies in future-oriented disclosures.     
Second, this research contributes to the accounting literature on unrealistic 
managerial optimism and overconfidence. Prior literature examines how managerial 
optimism impacts the decisions of managers, and provides evidence that managerial 
optimism causes managers to make sub-optimal operational and reporting decisions 
(e.g., see Camerer and Lovallo 1999; Malmendier and Tate 2005; Billett and Qian 
2008; Libby and Rennekamp 2012; Hribar and Yang 2015; Schrand and Zechman 
2012; Asay 2015). I contribute to that literature by examining how managerial 
optimism impacts the decisions of investors. I provide evidence that, despite the 
documented costs of managerial optimism, there are circumstances in which investors 
 50 
believe that managerial optimism is beneficial and make investment decisions based 
on those beliefs.  
Third, this study provides practical recommendations to managers and 
investors. For managers, it provides recommendations on how to design persuasive 
future-oriented disclosures. Whereas managers might be tempted to focus always on 
positive outcomes in future-oriented disclosures, this research suggests that managers 
can benefit by focusing on negative outcomes following good performance, in order to 
signal a more realistic outlook about the future. For investors, it provides evidence on 
systematic ways in which they allow a firm’s current-period performance to shape 
how they evaluate future-oriented disclosures. Although my study suggests that 
investors are aware of this influence, it also suggests that investors are unaware of the 
full extent of its influence. Thus, investors may wish to take steps to attenuate the 
impact of a firm’s current-period performance on how they evaluate future-oriented 
disclosures.  
Fourth, this research contributes to the psychology literature on unrealistic 
optimism. Prior research provides evidence that individuals believe that optimism is 
generally beneficial, and that certain contextual variables moderate individuals’ beliefs 
about the benefits of optimism (Armor et al. 2008; Tenney et al. 2015). I contribute to 
this literature by providing evidence of a novel construct that moderates individuals’ 
beliefs about the benefits of optimism, and by studying the downstream consequences 
of those beliefs.  
Finally, this research contributes to the accounting literature by introducing an 
alternative method by which researchers can test a hypothesized theoretical process. 
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Accounting researchers often test a hypothesized process by conducting a single study 
that manipulates independent variable(s) and measures mediating and dependent 
variables (“mediation-by-measurement”). I introduce an alternative approach 
advocated by Spencer et al. (2005), in which I conduct a series of experiments that 
tests each link in the hypothesized causal chain. This “mediation-by-manipulation” 
approach to testing process avoids the limitations of “mediation-by-measurement” 
designs and capitalizes on the comparative advantages of experiments (Spencer et al. 
2005; Libby et al. 2002).
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APPENDIX  
 
Appendix A. Real-World Examples of Challenge-Focused and Opportunity-Focused 
Disclosures 
 
Panel A: Challenge-Framed Strategy from JP Morgan Chase 2014 Letter to Shareholders 
 
Actual Disclosure (Challenge-Framed): 
 
“We have a huge obligation to society – not only must we never fail, but we need to be steadfast. 
Never failing means having the financial strength, liquidity, margins, and strong and diverse 
earnings where you can weather any storm. It also means having the ability to adapt, survive and 
even thrive through the cycles.” 
 
Alternative Disclosure (Opportunity-Framed): (Note: underlined terms have been changed from 
above) 
 
“We have a huge obligation to society – not only must we continually succeed, but we need to be 
steadfast.  Continually succeeding means having the financial strength, liquidity, margins, and 
strong and diverse earnings where you can seize any opportunity. It also means having the ability 
to adapt, survive and even thrive through the cycles.” 
 
Panel B: Opportunity-Framed Strategy from JP Morgan Chase 2013 Letter to Shareholders 
 
Actual Disclosure (Opportunity-Framed): 
 
“So to succeed long term, we need an excellent management team. And in my opinion, your 
management team has the character, culture, intellect, experience and wisdom necessary to 
succeed.” 
 
Alternative Disclosure (Challenge-Framed): (Note: underlined terms have been changed from 
above) 
 
“So to avoid failure long term, we need an excellent management team. And in my opinion, your 
management team has the character, culture, intellect, experience and wisdom necessary to avoid 
failure.”
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Appendix B. Earnings News Manipulation 
 
Panel A: Bad News 
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Appendix B (continued). Earnings News Manipulation 
 
Panel B: Good News 
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Appendix C. Challenge-Focused or Opportunity-Focused Manipulation 
 
Panel A: Challenge-Focused  
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Appendix C. Challenge-Focused or Opportunity-Focused Manipulation 
 
Panel B: Opportunity-Focused  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 57 
Appendix D. Beliefs about the Benefits of Managerial Optimism Manipulation 
 
Panel A: Article Describing the Benefits of Managerial Optimism 
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Appendix D (continued). Beliefs about the Benefits of Managerial Optimism 
Manipulation 
 
Panel B: Article Describing the Benefits of Managerial Realism 
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